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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PHYLLIS E. COLMAN, 
Plaint i f f -Respondent, 
v s . 
WILLIAM J . COLMAN, 
Defendant-Appel lant. 
Case No. 19835 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action against p l a i n t i f f s former husband to enforce a 
separation agreement, to compel an account ing, and for damages. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The t r ia l cour t entered judgment in favor of p la in t i f f for $279,199.00, 
plus interest of $59,960.50, and costs; ordered defendant to account to 
p la in t i f f for funds der ived from a Carson Sink project and for royal ty 
interests in o i l , gas, and other minerals; and retained jur isd ic t ion to 
determine additional damages to be awarded to p la in t i f f . 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment, and her costs. 
36k 
STATEMENT OF FACTS! 
Appellant 's statement of facts is not supported by the pages of the 
record cited in his b r ie f , and respondent cannot agree with the statement of 
facts. The following statement is supported by the record. 
The parties hereto were married on December 3 1 , 1953 (R. 5 ) , and 
dur ing the marriage acquired substantial p rope r t y , which was divided between 
them pursuant to a wr i t ten agreement at the time of the divorce (Ex. P - 1 , R. 
389, 390). The agreement is included in this br ie f as an appendix. 
Itemized descript ions of proper ty awarded to Appellant ("William") and 
respondent ( "Phyl l is" ) are set fo r th as Schedules "A" and " B . " 
Schedule " B " ent i t led "Wife's Property" requires William, wi th in one year 
from the date of the agreement, to fu rn ish Phyll is wi th a "complete accounting 
of all stocks owned by him or in which he has any interest" and a "complete 
accounting of all royal ty interests cu r ren t l y owned by him or in which he has 
any in teres t " ; awarded p la in t i f f one-haif of William's interest in Paradox 
Limited, a California limited par tnersh ip , a one-half interest in all stocks 
"held in husband's name or in which he has any in te res t , " and one-half of 
the part ies' interest in real proper ty known as the Anderson Ranch in Cache 
County , thereby ent i t l ing p la int i f f to "one-half the part ies' proceeds upon the 
sale of said p rope r t y . " 
A. Failure to Account for Stock 
The cour t below found that William owned at least 28,200 shares of stock 
in the Western Oil Shale Corporation and 48,000 shares in the Cayman 
Corporation at the time the parties were d ivorced, for which he had failed to 
account to Phyllis (R. 368-369). The court 's f inding is amply supported by 
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the evidence. On September 17, 1976, 50,820 shares of Western Oil Shale 
Corporation stock and 48,000 Cayman Corporation stock were pledged wi th 
First Securi ty Bank of Utah as collateral for loans made to William (Ex. P-13, 
R. 436-439, Ex. P-14, R. 439, 440). The stock pledged was issued in 
William's name or that of his b roker , except for 19,620 shares of Western Oil 
Shale Corporation stock issued in the name of his brother {Ex. P-15, R. 
445-447, 450, Ex. P-6, R. 480-481). 
Between September 17, 1978, and February 23, 1979, William held as 
many as 93,298 shares of Western Oil Shale Corporation stock and 48,000 
shares of Cayman Corporation stock in his personal bank and brokerage 
accounts. (Exs. P-13, P-25, P-26, P-38, R. 437, 587, 592, 593, 594, 
706-708). Al l transactions dealing with those stocks were authorized by 
William over his s ignature without any suggestion that he was acting on behalf 
of anyone but himself (Exs. P-13, P-25, P-26, P-38, P-39, R. 437, 587, 592, 
593, 594, 706-708, 709-711). 
On July 9, 1979, First Securi ty Bank released 48,000 shares of Cayman 
Corporation stock and 47,820 shares of Western Oil Shale Corporation stock to 
William on condit ion that he sign an indemnity agreement to protect the bank 
i f i t should be liable to Phyll is because of the del ivery (Ex . P-6, R. 
442-444). The indemnification agreement was required because , ! [ d ] u r i n g the 
period the loan account was maintained, the bank became aware of the divorce 
decree by which one half of Colman's interest in various securit ies including 
the Exhibi t A securit ies (Western Oil Shale and Cayman shares) was awarded 
to Colman's w i fe . " (Ex. P-6). 
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Despite the overwhelming evidence that William owned many thousands of 
shares held in brokerage accounts (Exs. P-21, P-25, P-26, P-38, P-39, R. 
597-599, 586, 587) in addit ion to those shares pledged with First Securi ty 
Bank, the cour t below conservatively awarded Phyll is judgment wi th respect 
to only the stock pledged to the bank at the time of the d ivorce, which stock 
was del ivered by the bank to William on July 9, 1979 (R. 266, 368, 369, 373, 
374), A t the time William took possession of the stock from First Securi ty 
Bank, the Western Oil Shale Corporation stock had a fair market value of 
$14.25 per share (Ex. P-7, R. 503-505); the t r ia l cour t retained jur isd ic t ion 
to determine the value of the Cayman Corporation stock at a later date (R. 
374). 
B. Failure to Account for Royalty Interests 
At the time of the d ivorce, William agreed to account to Phyllis for all 
royal ty interests in o i l , gas, and other mineral interests held in his name or 
in which he had any interest (Append ix , Schedule B ) . Some of those royal ty 
interests were described in the agreement, others were not . At the t r i a l , 
William stated that in order to fu l ly account for all of his royal ty in terests , 
one would have to t ravel from Santa Fe, New Mexico, to Anchorage, Alaska 
(R. 419-421). Al though William claimed to have accounted for his royal ty 
in terests , he could produce no wr i t ing or accounting whatsoever (R. 419-421, 
457-461). 
On May 30, 1980, William listed various mineral interests on his financial 
statements as having a value in excess of $1,800,000 although he claimed to 
have earned not more than $1,600 from those propert ies since the part ies' 
4 
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divorce (Exs. P-5, P-4, R. 412-413). The t r ia l cour t found William's claim to 
be incredible and ordered a complete and fu l l accounting (R. 267-268). 
C. Failure to Account for Paradox Partnership Interest 
William is the owner of a 10% interest in a California limited par tnership 
known as Paradox Limited (R. 517), which has an interest in a mineral 
explorat ion development known as the Carson Sink (R. 519-523). In May 
1976, William valued his 10% interest in the par tnersh ip at $92,000 (Ex. P-3). 
The t rue value of his interest in the par tnership and the partnership 's 
interest in the Carson Sink Project was not determinable by the evidence and 
testimony given at t r i a l , and William was ordered to produce an accounting 
{R. 517-528, 265, 267, 268, 374). 
D, Failure to Account for Proceeds from Sale of Anderson Ranch 
The proper ty settlement agreement executed at the time of the parties1 
divorce recognizes that the parties had an interest in real proper ty known as 
the Anderson Ranch in Cache County , Utah. The Anderson Ranch was held 
in the name of Royalty Investments Corporat ion, and unt i l i ts sale in January 
1982, was the only substantial asset of the corporat ion (Ex. P-10, R. 
554-556). In 1980, William test i f ied in a deposition that he and Phyllis owned 
62i% of the stock of Royalty Investments Corporation (R. 551), b u t , at the 
t r ia l asserted that Owanah Oil Corporation was the actual owner of the 62i% 
interest in Royalty Investments, Inc. This contradict ion was noted by the 
t r ia l court (R. 551-552). 
In May 1976, and October 1977, William valued the Anderson Ranch in 
his personal f inancial statements at $250,000 and $560,000 (Exs. P-3, P-4, R. 
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555) and in a personal financial statement of May 1980, he attached a value of 
$1,000,000 to the asset (Ex. P-5, R. 555). 
Royalty Investments Corporation sold the Anderson Ranch in January 
1982, for $250,000 cash (Ex. P-10, R. 556). All the proceeds from this sale 
were deposited in the account of Owanah Oil Corporat ion, although Owanah 
paid no consideration to Royalty for the proceeds received (R. 557). The 
money so deposited was used to pay William's residential mortgage as well as 
l ight and telephone b i l l s , and some was paid to William in the form of cash 
(Ex. P-47, R. 755-756). Al l such payments were made d i rect ly out of the 
account of Owanah Oil Corporation (Ex. P-47, R. 735-737), which William 
referred to as his own account in correspondence with First Security Bank 
(Ex. P-44, R.735). There was no evidence adduced at t r ia l that William 
maintained any personal checking account apart from the one in the name of 
Owanah Oil Corporat ion. 
Al though William was the president of Royalty Investments Corporation 
(R. 548), he could produce no records of the corporation which would show 
the shareholders, by- laws, or financial status (R. 105, 551-552). On 
December 17, 1983, eleven months after the sale of the ranch , and three days 
before t r i a l , an authorization by the purpor ted Board of Directors of Royalty 
Investments Corporation was draf ted and executed, on advice of counsel, in 
preparation for t r ia l (P. 48, R. 778-780). William characterized the document 
as a " ra t i f i ca t ion" rather than an authorization (R. 781). At no time dur ing 
t r ia l d id William prof fer the testimony of anyone other than himself purpor t ing 
to have an interest in Royalty Investments, I nc . , Owanah Oil Corporat ion, 
the Anderson Ranch, or the stocks at issue. 
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THE ISSUE OF "ALTER EGO" WAS PROPERLY 
BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT 
Phyllis brought her action against William in an ef for t to make him 
account for assets he owned at the time the parties were divorced and to 
which she is en t i t led . At the t r i a l , she ident i f ied stocks wi th a value of 
hundreds of thousands of dollars that William told various individuals were his 
at the time the parties were divorced and which were, in fac t , held in his 
personal bank and brokerage accounts at the time the parties were divorced 
and thereafter (Exs. P-4, P-5, P-6, P-13, P-17, P-25, P-26, P-38, P-39, R. 
434-451, 706-710, 598-605). 
When the complaint was f i led i t was not possible for a pleader to foresee 
that the alter ego issue would ar ise. Plaint i f f was seeking assets (or their 
value) wh ich , from all appearances, belonged to the defendant. I t was at the 
t r ia l that defendant, for the f i r s t t ime, claimed that his stock actually 
belonged to Owanah Oil Corporation (R. 628-630). 
A similar problem existed with respect to the Anderson Ranch sale. The 
complaint in this case was f i led in May 1980. The ranch was not sold unt i l 
January 4 , 1982, and Phyllis did not discover this fact unt i l approximately 
two months before t r i a l . Plaint i f f d id not discover that the proceeds had 
been given to Owanah Oil Corporation unt i l even later. 
Defendant argues that the issue of alter ego was not proper ly before the 
t r ia l court because the pleadings had not been amended to include i t . 
Amendment of the pleadings is expressly not required by Rule 15(b) , Utah 
Rules of Civi l Procedure, which prov ides, in per t inent par t : 
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when issues not raised by the pleadings are t r ied by express or 
implied consent of the par t ies, they should be treated in all 
respects as i f they had been raised in the pleadings. Such 
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to 
conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon 
motion of any par ty at any t ime, even after judgment; but fai lure 
to amend does not effect the result of the t r ia l of these issues. I f 
the evidence is objected to at t r ia l on the ground that i t is not 
wi th in the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the 
pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the 
action wil l be subserved thereby and the objecting par ty fails to 
sat isfy the cour t that the admission of such evidence would 
prejudice him in his action or defense upon the meri ts. 
Rule 15(b) places upon a par ty the burden of objecting to evidence that 
goes to issues he is not prepared to t r y . General Insurance Company 
of America v . Carnicero Dynasty Corporat ion, 545 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 1976). 
Defendant impliedly consented to the t r ia l of the issue of alter ego by 
defending on the grounds that Owanah Oil Corporation in actual i ty owned the 
stock held in his name and in his bank and brokerage accounts. In f ind ing 
that Owanah Oil Corporation was in fact the alter ego of defendant, the court 
correct ly recognized that Owanah Oil Corporation is merely a tool which the 
William uses to hide his personal assets from his former wi fe. The court 's 
f ind ing is amply supported by the record. 
In Cheney v . Rucker, 14 Utah 2.d 205, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (1963) this 
cour t approved the defendant's imposition of an aff i rmative defense raised for 
the f i r s t at t r ia l in contravention of Rule 8 ( c ) , Utah Rules of Civi l Procedure 
by reasoning as follows: 
It is a good rule whose purpose is to have the issues to be t r ied 
clearly framed. But i t is not the only rule in the book of rules of 
c iv i l procedure. They must all be looked to in the l ight of their 
even more fundamental purpose of l iberal izing both pleading and 
procedure to the end that the parties are afforded the pr iv i lege of 
presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to 
8 
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their d ispute . What they are ent i t led to is notice of the issues 
raised and an oppor tun i ty to meet them. 
See also FMA Financial Corporation v . Bu i l d , I n c . , 17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 
670, 672 (1965). 
In the instant case, the issue of alter ego arose not as par t of p l a i n t i f f s 
case- in-chief , but as a rebuttal to defendant's defense. Defendant, wi th 
notice of his own defense, surely should have been able to anticipate and 
prepare for p l a i n t i f f s meeting that defense. 
Defendant asserts on appeal that he d id not impliedly consent that the 
issue of alter ego be t r ied in the cour t below because "defendant could have 
offered additional evidence had he been aware of the unpleaded theo ry " . 
(Br ie f at 14). Defendant asserts that i f alter ego had been pleaded he could 
have adduced evidence that Phyll is was always aware that the stock in 
question was acquired wi th Owanah assets, and she did not regard the stock 
pledged with the bank as part of the marital estate. (Br ie f 15). 
I f p la in t i f f was aware that the stock at issue belonged to Owanah Oil 
Corporation rather than defendant, and i f she d id not regard the stock as 
par t of the marital estate, and i f defendant thought she would so tes t i f y , 
such testimony would obviously be material to defendant's pr imary defense 
against the action for an account ing, i . e . , that defendant held the stock as 
t rustee for the corporat ion. Indeed, such evidence would not have been 
made more material i f the issue of alter ego had been part of the pleadings. 
Because such evidence would have been relevant to defendant's pr imary 
defense in any event , th is cour t must assume that William would not have 
prof fered the evidence had alter ego been raised in a pleading. 
9 
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Defendant also asserts that he cannot be held to have impliedly 
consented to the t r ia l of the issue of alter ego because the evidence 
presented by p la in t i f f at t r ia l was relevant to pleaded issues as well as the 
issue of alter ego. Defendant's argument is clearly contradicted by the 
record. Most of the evidence at t r ia l d i rect ly and pr imari ly bore upon the 
issue of the relat ionship between defendant and Owanah Oil Corporat ion. 
Some evidence was material to no other issue than whether defendant and 
Owanah Oil Corporation were one and the same. Such evidence included 
defendant's use of Owanah's bank accounts to pay his personal obligations 
and expenses (Ex. P-47); defendant's referra l in formal correspondence to 
Owanah's investor fund account as "my account" (Ex. P-44); and defendant's 
inabi l i ty to produce corporate records to substantiate the existence of other 
shareholders and off icers of the corporation (R. 101-102). The issue of 
"al ter ego" was thoroughly explored at t r i a l . 
In l ight of defendant's assertion that the stock in his name was in fact 
the stock of Owanah, and of evidence regarding the relationship between 
Owanah and William, William must have understood that the evidence presented 
was "aimed at the unpleaded issue" of "al ter ego." MB[ Motor Company \/. 
Lotus/East, 506 F.2d 709, 711 (6 C i r . 1974). 
II 
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL CLEARLY SHOWED THAT OWANAH OIL 
CORPORATION IS DEFENDANT'S ALTER EGO 
William test i f ied at t r ia l that he and Phyllis owned approximately 20% of 
all outstanding shares of Owanah Oil Corporation (R. 633-634). Phyllis was 
unable to rebut that testimony because William was unable or unwil l ing to 
10 
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produce any documents which would prove the identit ies of the shareholders 
of Owanah Oil Corporation and thei r respective interests at the time the 
parties were divorced (R. 102). Nevertheless, the evidence at t r ia l showed 
that to the extent the William holds proper ty as the purpor ted t rustee of 
Owanah Oil Corporat ion, and to the extent he received money from the sale of 
the Anderson Ranch into the Owanah bank account, Owanah is his alter ego, 
and the corporate ent i ty should be d is regarded. 
William argues that because he owned less than substant ial ly all of the 
shares of Owanah Oil Corporation at the time of the part ies' d ivorce, he is 
completely protected from any possibi l i ty that the doctr ine of alter ego wil l be 
invoked to prevent the manipulation of his assets to the detr iment of his 
former wi fe . However, the decisions of this cour t a f ford him no such 
protect ion. In Dockstader v . Walker, 29 Utah 2d 370, 510 P.2d 526, 528 
(1973), this cour t made clear that all that is required for the cour t to ignore 
the corporate ent i ty and f ind that i t is the "stockholder and not the 
corporat ion which owns the asset" is that " the courts see clearly that the 
corporate ent i ty is but a sham, and it is the stockholder who is doing 
business behind the corporate sh ie ld . " Simi lar ly, in Geary v„ Cain, 79 Utah 
368, 9 P.2d 396, 398 (1932), the cour t states that the corporate alter ego 
doctr ine "means that cour ts , ignor ing forms and looking to the substance or 
th ings , wi l l regard stockholders of a corporat ion as the owners of its 
p rope r t y , or the real parties in interest whenever i t is necessary * * * to do 
justice which might otherwise f a i l . " 
In Norman \/. Murray First T h r i f t and Loan Company, 596 P.2d 1028, 
1030 (Utah 1979), th is cour t held that before a corporat ion can be found to 
11 
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be the alter ego of an indiv idual " there must be such un i ty of interest and 
ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the individual 
no longer exist" and that "observance of the corporate form would promote 
injustice * * * or an inequitable result would fo l low." The Norman decision 
does not require that the individuals own any part icular percentage of the 
outstanding shares of the corporate alter ego. 
William control led the assets of Owanah Oil Corporat ion, completely 
independent of other nominal shareholders or of f icers. He test i f ied that no 
corporate records are kept regarding the assets which he says he holds in 
t r us t (R. 748), or the ident i ty of shareholders (R. 102). William consistently 
refers to the claimed corporate assets and accounts as his personal proper ty 
(Exs. P-4, P-5, P-44), unless he perceives that he may benefit by separating 
the corporation from himself. 
The evidence shows such "un i ty of interest and ownership" regarding 
the assets at issue " that the separate personalities of the corporation and the 
individual no longer ex is t " wi th respect to those assets. Norman v .^ Murray 
First T h r i f t and Loan Company, at 1030. I t is immaterial that William may 
own less than substantial ly all of the stock of the corporat ion. 
The second cr i ter ion of the Norman decision is also present in this case, 
because recognition of a separate corporate ent i ty would promote in just ice. I f 
William is permitted to br ing his personal assets under the protection of a 
corporate umbrella merely by assert ing that he holds them in t r us t for the 
corporate en t i t y , he wil l successfully avoid his obligation to account to 
p la int i f f and d is t r ibute to her one-half of the assets he owned at the time of 
their d ivorce. 
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William asserts that holding him liable to p la in t i f f wil l be unjust to the 
corporat ion, but Owanah wil l not be affected by a money judgment against 
defendant. The judgment of the cour t below does not pu rpor t to determine 
t i t le to proper ty held in Owanah's name. I t is a money judgment against 
defendant based on defendant's fai lure to account for p roper ty held in his 
name, in his personal accounts, and under his d i rect control at the time of 
the d ivorce. 
I l l 
BY APPLYING ALTER EGO, THE TRIAL COURT EFFECTUATED 
THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES1 PROPERTY 
DISTRIBUTION AGREEMENT 
William asserts that i f the corporate ent i ty is ignored, Phyll is wil l 
received one-half of all p roper ty acquired by Owanah by ut i l izat ion of outside 
investor capital over some 15 years of operat ion, and that such an outcome 
was clearly not intended by the par t ies. In suppor t , he refers the cour t to 
the fact that on August 27, 1978, he demanded from p la i n t i f f s a t to rneys, and 
received some 8,300 shares of common stock of Western Oil Shale Corporation 
or ig inal ly held in an account at Wilson Davis Company clearly marked as 
belonging to Owanah Oil Corporat ion. Defendant asserts that by this act , 
Phyll is acknowledged the separateness of William and Owanah Oil Corporation 
and the intent of the proper ty d is t r ibut ion agreement that she not share in 
assets that were clearly Owanah's. 
At t r i a l , Phyll is d id not seek an accounting for the 8,300 shares of 
common stock previously acknowledged to be the sole proper ty of Owanah Oil 
Corporat ion. The judgment of the t r ia l cour t does not consider those shares. 
In awarding a money judgment, the t r ia l cour t considered only those shares 
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pledged wi th First Securi ty Bank at the time of the parties1 d ivorce, to 
secure loans to William, which shares defendant received from the bank on 
July 9, 1979, despite Phyllis1 interest in those shares (R. 265-267, Ex. P-6). 
There may be some transactions in which Owanah Oil Corporation could be 
regarded as a separate en t i t y , but not in a situation in which the corporation 
is used to shield William from the legitimate claims of his former wi fe. He 
should not be permitted to use the assets as his own, but a t t r ibu te the 
ownership to his company when they are threatened. 
IV 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ESTOPPED TO DENY THAT DEFENDANT 
FURNISHED AN ADEQUATE ACCOUNTING 
SATISFACTORY TO HEFt 
William asserts that because in August 1978, p l a i n t i f f s attorneys released 
certain shares of stock to him as not wi th in the accounting contemplated by 
the divorce decree, that they are estopped to deny that defendant has 
accounted for all other shares of stock that should be accounted fo r . I t is 
clear from the face of the receipt relied on by defendant (Ex. P-8) that the 
document is not a release of any k ind or a statement that defendant has fu l ly 
accounted to Phyll is for the marital proper ty set fo r th in the divorce decree. 
The document does not even purpor t to exclude the subject shares from an 
eventual account ing. I t is merely a record that those shares were delivered 
into defendant's control as the president of Owanah Oil Corporation on that 
date. 
In Morgan v . Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1976), this 
court explained the doctr ine of estoppel as follows5 
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Estoppel is a doctr ine of equi ty proposed to rescue from loss a 
par ty who has, wi thout fau l t , been deluded into a course of action 
by the wrong or neglect of another, 
William could not reasonably have been deluded by the act of p l a i n t i f f s 
at torneys into th ink ing that he could expropr iate p l a i n t i f f s interest in shares 
of stock held by First Securi ty Bank to his own use upon their release by 
the bank, and defend his actions on the allegation that the shares, although 
held in his name and in his account, were really the proper ty of Owanah Oil 
Corporat ion. Unlike the shares del ivered to him by the bank, the stock 
del ivered to him by p la i n t i f f s at torneys were shown to have been held in an 
account at Wilson Davis Company clearly marked as that of Owanah Oil 
Corporat ion. 
In Kelly v . Richards, 95 Utah 560, 83 P.2d 731, 734 (Utah 1938), th is 
cour t said of estoppel: 
In order to const i tute this k ind of estoppel there must a false 
representation or concealment of material facts; but i t must have 
been made with knowledge, actual or cons t ruc t ive , of the facts; the 
par ty to whom i t was made must have been without knowledge or 
the means of knowledge of the real facts; and must have been made 
wi th the intention that i t should be acted upon; and the par ty to 
whom i t was made must have relied on or acted upon i t to his 
prejudice. 
William can show none of the elements of estoppel. I t was he, not 
Phyl l is , who had knowledge of his relat ionship with Owanah; i t was he, not 
Phyllis or her counsel, who had knowledge that he was using the company as 
an alter ego. 
The evidence established that William owned stocks and other proper ty 
total l ing in excess of $500,000 for which he failed to account to Phyll is (R. 
367-372). The proper ty for which he failed to account came into his ultimate 
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control in July 1979, when the bank released stock held by i t as collateral for 
loans to William and in January 1982, when the Anderson Ranch was sold and 
the proceeds d is t r ibuted to him in the name of Owanah Oil Corporat ion, In 
no respect could William have been misled by p la in t i f f s actions into believing 
that he d id not have to account for those assets, 
William suggests in his br ie f on appeal that Phyll is waited for more than 
two years after the accounting should have been and was made, saw what 
disposit ion of proper ty was made, and then decided whether to claim all that 
proper ty as marital estate. (Br ie f 28). The suggestion is unsupported by the 
record . Phyllis was in continual contact wi th William or his attorney 
concerning the fai lure to comply wi th the proper ty settlement agreement and 
the decree of d ivorce, and had brought a pr ior law suit against William to 
enforce the decree and the agreement (R. 572). William asserts that Phyllis 
"said nothing to William or so far as the record shows, to the bank about any 
claim of r i gh t to pledged stock which surv ived defendant's accounting (Br ie f 
26). While the record may not show p la in t i f f s numerous demands on William 
and the pledgee bank, neither does the record support William's intimation to 
the con t ra ry . 
V 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE ACCOUNTING AT TRIAL SHOWS 
DEFENDANT IS INDEBTED TO PLAINTIFF FOR 31.25 PERCENT OF 
THE PROCEEDS FROM THE SALE OF THE ANDERSON RANCH IS 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
William argues that the judgment wi th respect to the Anderson Ranch was 
based on some k ind of undisclosed t r us t theory or other undisclosed theory 
whereby Royalty Investments Corporation was obligated to d is t r ibute the 
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proceeds from the sale of the ranch to the William. No such theory was 
presented to the t r ia l cour t . 
The proper ty settlement agreement of the parties provides that Phyllis is 
ent i t led to "one-half of the parties1 interest in real proper ty known as the 
Anderson Ranch" and "one-hal f of the parties1 proceeds upon the sale of said 
p roper ty " (Append ix , Schedule B 1120). Implicit in the reference to the 
ranch is the assumption that the part ies owned some interest in the ranch , or 
that William so control led the nominal owner, that he could control the 
disposit ion of the ranch and any proceeds from the sale. Indeed, the William 
listed the Anderson Ranch as a personal asset on his financial statements 
(Exs. P-4, P-5). 
William test i f ied at his deposition pr ior to t r ia l that he owned 62i% of 
Royalty Investments, I n c . , which owned the ranch (R. 551), and that he was 
president of Royalty Investments, Inc. (R. 548). There is no credible 
evidence to support William's present contention that i t was, in fac t , Owanah 
Oil Corporation who owned the 62£% interest in Royalty Investments. William 
admitted at t r ia l that he caused Royalty Investments to sell the ranch in 
January 1982 (R. 556, 559-560), that he deposited the proceeds from the sale 
d i rect ly into the bank accounts of Owanah Oil Corporation (R. 557), that 
Owanah Oil Corporation paid nothing for the proceeds i t received from the 
sale (R. 557), and that he retained an option in his own name to repurchase 
the ranch (R. 560, Ex. P-12). The funds from the sale were used in par t to 
pay his personal l iv ing expenses d i rect ly out of the Owanah account (Ex. 
P-47, R. 755-756), which defendant referred to as his own (Ex. P-44, R. 
735). I t would be consistent for defendant to give his personal funds to 
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Owanah for the development of the Carson Sink Project, f o r , as defendant 
points out in his post- t r ia l br ie f and in his br ie f on appeal, William has, in 
fact , " r isked his ent i re personal for tune on its eventual success11 (R. 289, 
Br ief 19). 
Phyllis urged the t r ia l court to f ind that there was a d is t r ibut ion of the 
proceeds from the sale of the Anderson Ranch to William inasmuch as the 
evidence showed William construct ively received the proceeds and then gave 
them to Owanah Oil Corporat ion. The court fs f ind ing that Owanah Oil 
Corporation was defendant's alter ego and that the part ial accounting received 
at t r ia l "shows that William is indebted to Phyll is in the amount of $78,125, 
which is 31.25% of $250,000" should be aff irmed as suf f ic ient ly supported by 
the record , regardless of the theory adopted. 
VI 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND JUDGMENT OF THE 
TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED 
In the case of McBride v . McBride, 581 P.2d 996, 997 (Utah 1978), this 
court s tated: 
While i t is the responsibi l i ty of th is court to review the evidence in 
equi ty cases, i t wil l not d is tu rb the f indings of fact made below 
unless they appear to be clearly erroneous and against the weight 
of evidence. In conducting our review of the evidence we are of 
course mindful of the advantaged position of the t r ia l judge who 
sees and hears the witnesses and we are constrained to give due 
deference to his decisions by reason thereof. (Emphasis added.) 
In his br ie f on appeal William sets fo r th the background, creat ion, and 
operation of Owanah Oil Corporat ion, all as told by William, and concludes 
that at the time of incorporation in 1959, William and Phyllis together held 20% 
of the corporat ion and contr ibuted less than one-tenth of 1% of the 
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corporat ion's capital (Br ie f 3 ) . He asserts that there are numerous 
stockholders of Owanah Oil Corporation and Royalty Investments Corporation 
to whom he owes a f iduc iary du ty as the control l ing o f f icer , and that all 
assets in his name or in his con t ro l , in which Phyll is claims an in terest , are 
held and control led by him in t r us t for the other stockholders in the 
corporat ions. 
In support of his contention that the stock cert i f icates pledged wi th 
Fi rst Securi ty Bank were the proper ty of o thers , and not subject to the 
claims of his former w i fe , William test i f ied that he had held the stock for some 
15 years in t r us t for o thers , al though no documents suppor t ing his testimony 
were offered at t r i a l . In support of his contention that the proceeds from 
the sale of the Anderson Ranch were not d is t r ibu ted to him but reinvested in 
Owanah Oil Corporation by Royalty Investments, which owned the ranch , 
William submitted minutes of a meeting of the Board of Directors of Royalty 
Investments — minutes that were wr i t ten 11 months after the sale, and three 
days before t r i a l . 
The judgment of the t r ia l cour t shows that the judge did not believe 
defendant's test imony. On several occasions in the last two days of t r i a l , the 
cour t questioned William's cred ib i l i ty (R. 679, 698-699, 701). 
A t t r i a l , William's testimony that he had not made any stock transactions 
through the brokerage f i rm of Wilson-Davis and Company for 10 years was 
d i rect ly contradicted by Cora Powell, a Wilson-Davis employee, who test i f ied 
that she recognized Mr. Colman, authenticated his signature on stock 
receipts, dated in February and March, evidincing the receipt of over 44,000 
shares of Western Oil Shale stock and test i f ied that she had spoken to Mr. 
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Colman about his account around February 6, 1979 (Exs. P-25, P-26, P-38, 
P-39, R. 576,577, 585-596). Similar ly, none of the documents produced by 
William shows any connection between Owanah Oil Corporation and the stocks 
held by First Securi ty Bank for which judgment was rendered. At most, the 
exhibi ts show that some other Western Oil Shale stocks were held in the name 
of Owanah Oil Corporation at some time in the past. 
In assembling his br ie f , William has cited facts favorable only to his own 
interests and claims, to the exclusion of other evidence favorable to Phyl l is . 
That practice was condemned by this court in Thomson v . Condas, 27 Utah 
2d 129, 493 P.2d 639, 641 (1972), in which the court sa id , at p. 640, " i t is 
the prerogat ive of the arb i ter of the facts in our judicial system to believe or 
disbelieve testimony of a controversial bent " . 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant 's spi r i ted attack upon the alter ego f ind ing seems designed to 
d iver t the court 's attention from the more fundamental issue of whether the 
assets were owned by him or by someone else. 
Whether based on a theory of alter ego, or on disbelief of the claimed 
oral t r u s t s , the evidence requires f indings and judgment that at the time of 
the part ies' d ivorce, William J . Colman owned at least 28,200 shares of 
Western Oil Shale stock and 48,000 shares of Cayman Corporation stock, for 
which he failed to account to Phyllis Colman. The evidence also established 
convincingly that William failed to account to Phyll is for proceeds he derived 
from the sale of the Anderson Ranch, that he failed to account to her for 
money received by him from his interests in the Paradox Limited Partnership, 
and that he failed to account to her for receipts from royal ty interests in o i l , 
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gas, and other mineral properties. The judgment of the trial court should be 
affirmed. 
Bryce E. Roe 
ROE, FOWLER S MOXLEY 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and 
Michael N. Zundel 
370 East South Temple, #401 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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I hereby certify that on the /.?'-' day of July, 1984,, I served the 
foregoing Respondent's Brief upon Frank J . Allen, attorney for appellant, by 
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addressed as follows: 
Frank J . Allen 
CLYDE, PRATT, GIBBS £ CAHOON 
77 West Second South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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APPENDIX 
AGREEMENT 
AGREEMENT made -Jttiy *< - , 1977, between William q. 
Colman, hereinafter referred to as Husband, and Phyllis JE. 
Colman, hereinafter referred to as Wife. 
Whereas the parties were married in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, on December 31, 1953, and 
Whereas in consequence of disputes and differences the 
parties have separated, and are now and for some time have 
been living apart from each other, and since their separa-
tion have agreed to live separately and apart for the rest 
of their lives, and 
Whereas the parties desire to confirm their separation 
and make arrangements in connection therewith including the 
settlement of their property rights and other rights and 
obligations growing out of the marriage relation, 
IT IS THEREFORE AGREED: 
1. The consideration for this agreement is the imitual 
promises and agreements herein contained. 
2. It shall be lawful for each party hereafter to live 
separately and apart from the other party at such location 
and under whatever circumstances each party shall deem fit, 
free from interference, authority, or control, direct br 
indirect, from the other party. 
3. Husband and Wife represent to each other, that in 
their individual capacities, each has not incurred any debts 
or made any contracts for which the other may be liable, 
except as listed in Schedules A and B, attached hereto, and 
I * PLAINTIFFS 
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incorporated by reference herein. Each party represents to 
the other that he or she will not incur any such debts or 
make any such contracts so long as the other party performs 
all of the obligations undertaken as a result of this agree-
ment. 
4. Subject to the provisions of this agreement, each 
party has released and discharged, and by this agreement 
does for himself or herself, and his or her heirs, legal 
representatives, executors, administrators, and assigns, 
release and discharge the other of and from all causes of 
action, claims, rights or demands whatsoever, in law or 
equity, which either of the parties ever had or now has 
against the other, except any or all cause or causes of 
action for divorce. 
5. The parties have agreed upon an equitable division 
of all real and personal property owned by them. All prop-
erty listed in said Schedule A, attached hereto, shall 
constitute the property of Husband, subject to the obliga-
tions and duties noted therein, and Wife releases all other 
rights which she might otherwise have therein. All property 
listed in said Schedule B, attached hereto, shall constitute 
the property of Wife, subject to the obligations and duties 
noted therein, and Husband releases all other rights which 
he might otherwise have therein. After this date each party 
. shall have all rights and obligations of ownership in his or 
her property free of any claim or right of the party, as if 
the marriage between them had never occurred. 
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G. Except as otherwise! particularly divided, and 
listed in Schedules A and B, the personal effects and 
household goods and all other articles or personal 
property which have heretofore been used by them in 
common have been divided by the parties to their mutual 
satisfaction, and neither party will make any claim tp 
any such items which are now in the possession or und^r 
the control of the other party. 
7. The parties agree and stipulate that this settle-
ment agreement represents an equitable division of their-
real and personal property. 
8» Husband is self-supporting and wife has dependejd 
upon him for her support. Husband shall pay to wife for 
her support and maintenance the sum of five hundred dollars 
($500.00) per month on the first day of each month, said 
payment to be mailed to Box 391, Edgartown, Massachusetts 
02539, or such other address as may be designated by wife. 
The amount of the payment is based upon husband's repre-
sentation that he does not presently have annual income, 
and if the parties are subsequently divorced, the court 
may retain jurisdiction to modify said payment on th& 
basis of wife^ needs and husband's income. 
9. Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to 
prevent either of the parties from maintaining an action 
for absolute divorce against the other in any juris-j 
diction based upon any past or future conduct of the other, 
nor to bar the other from defending any such suit. In any 
such action, the parties shall be bound by all the terms 
of this agreement, and, if consistent with the rules or 
practice of the court granting the decree of absolute divorce, 
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this agreement shall be incorporated in such decree. This 
agreement shall not be merged in such decree, but shall in 
all respects survive the same and be forever binding and 
conclusive upon the parties. 
10c If either party breaches any provision of this 
agreement, the other party shall have the right to sue for 
damages for such breach, rescind this agreement and maintain 
an action for separation, or seek such other remedies or 
relief as may be available at law or in equity. 
11. This agreement contains the entire understanding of 
the parties, and there are no representations, warranties, 
convenants, or undertakings other than those expressly set 
forth herein. 
12. Any additions to, modifications or waivers of any 
of the provisions of this agreement shall be effective only 
upon consent of both parties and only if made in writing and 
executed with the same formality as this agreement. 
13. This agreement shall be construed and governed in 
accordance with the laws of the State of Utah. 
14. If any provision of this agreement is held to be 
invalid or unenforceable, all other provisions shall never-
theless continue in full force and effect. 
15. Each party shall at all times keep the other 
informed of his or her place of residence, and shall promptly 
notify the other of any change giving the address of the new 
place of residence. 
16. Each party shall execute and deliver to the other 
all instruments of transfer and documents of ownership 
required to perform such parties' obligations under this 
agreement. 
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17. The parties acknowledge that this agreement is fair, 
adequate and satisfactory and is freely executed by each of 
them individually, without undue influence, coercion, threat, 
or promise by the other or anyone. Each of them, therefore, 
accepts the provisions of this agreement as a full and final 
settlement and satisfaction of all claims and demands each 
may have against the other. 
18. All provisions of this agreement shall be binding 
upon the respective heirs, next of kin, executors, and 
administrators of the parties. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties have executed this agree-
ment in duplicate on the day and year first above written. 
—f 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
0 n t h e
 % ~ d a v o f -^ufl-T'/ 1977, personally appeared &**" 
before me WILLIAM J. COLMAN and PHYLLIS E. COLMAN, the I 
signers of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged 
to me that they executed the same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC, Residing in 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
SCHEDULE A 
Husband's Property 
1. • Husband shall receive $7,500.00 upon the sale of 
the parties1 real property located at 2378 Cottonwood Lane, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, formerly the home of the parties. 
2. Husband shall keep all payments current on New York 
Life Insurance Policy no. 26 041 165 and shall keep wife as 
the named beneficiary therein. •^ *^ <ty 
3. Husband shall keep all payments current on Government 
Life Insurance Policy No. v 109 72 73, 3210-292C and shall 
keep wife as the named beneficiary. 
4. Husband shall keep all payments current on Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Policy no. and shall keep wife as the 
named beneficiary. 
5. One-half interest in all stock held in husband's name 
or in which he has any interest. Those stocks include but are 
not limited to: Western Oil Shale; Owanha Oil Corporation; 
Petroleum Investment Corporation; Solar Resources, Inc.; Cayman 
Corporation (both common stock and warrants); Royarty Invest-
ment; Franciscan Oil; Friar Oil; Canyonlands Uranium; Silver 
Star-Queens Mines, Inc.; Manhattan Resources; Saihson Oil and 
Gas; Crescent General; and Sharp Mining Company. 
Within one year from the date of this agreement, husband 
shall furnish wife with a complete accounting of all stocks 
currently owned by him or in which he has any interest. 
If any stock held in husband's name or in which he has 
any interest has been pledged as collateral or security for 
any personal or corporate loan, husband shall remain liable 
for any indebtedness on said loan or loans. 
6. One-half of all royalty interests in all oil, gas 
and other minerals held in husband's name, or in which /? y (^ ^ 
husband has any interest. Those royalty interests include 
but are not limited to: Paradox Basin; Manhattan Unit, Rio 
Blanco County, Colorado; Last Chance, Emery County, Utah; 
and mineral interests in Jackson County, Colorado. 
Within one year from the date of this agreement, husband 
shall furnish wife with a complete accounting of all royalty 
interests currently owned by him or in which he has any interest. 
If any royalty interest held in husband's name or in 
which he has any interest has been pledged as collateral or 
security for any personal or corporate loan, husband shall 
remain liable for any indebtedness on said loan or loans. 
7. Husband shall retain all of his interest in the 
Great Salt Lake leases. 
8. Husband's one-half interest in the parties undivided 
one-half interest in the following described real property: 
a. Lts 17, 18 &19 (Less Railroad R/W) Blk 59 
c\ Park City, Utah 
)-l~^  b. All of lot 14 & S 1/2 lot 15 Blk 58 Park C^ty 
Survey 
c. Lots 17 to 32 incl Blk 58 Park City Survey 
9. Husband shall retain all rights and interest in all 
other real property either in his name or in which he has 
any interest, which has not been specifically disposed o£ 
by this agreement. 
10. The stock in ISI Industries is to be held in trust 
by Roe and Fowler pending the outcome of current litigation. 
At the conclusion of said litigation the stock awarded to 
husband or any net proceeds from its sale are to be divided 
equally between the parties, one-half to husband and oner // K* 
half to wife. 
/ 
- 2 -
11. One-half of each of husband's personal savings 
accounts including any savings accounts pledged as collateral 
for any personal or corporate loans. Husband shall remain 
liable for any indebtedness on said loan or loans. 
12. One-half of husband's interest in Paradox Limited, 
a California Limited Partnership. 
13. One-half of proceeds from the sale of the parties' 
real property located in Bartlett, New Hampshire if and when 
wife sells said property. 
14. One-half of husband's interest in real property 
located on East Main Street, Vernal, Utah. 
15. One-half interest in Malcolm C. Petrie's promissory 
note of April 19, 1975 to husband. Said one-half interest 
being equal to $3,125.00 plus interest if any. 
IS. One-half of the parties' interest in real property 
known as the Anderson Ranch, Hyrum, Cache County, Utah. 
Husband has the right of first refusal in the event wife 
shall sell her interest. 
17. Wife shall be given 20 days notice and shall have 
the right to be present when the three (3) safe deposit boxes 
in the names of Ellen C. Colman and William J. Colman, located 
in Quincy, Massachusetts are opened. Husband shall give 
Robert J. Colman the power of attorney to open the three (3) 
safe deposit boxes. 
ft% 
SCHEDULE B 
Wife's Property 
1. The real property located at 2378 Cottonwood Lante, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, formerly the home of the parties, o^r 
any proceeds received from its sale. 
2. The furniture and personal effects located in th^ 
above described real property which have not already beenj 
divided by the parties. 
3. All dividends and proceeds received from husband's 
New York Life Insurance Policy no. 26 041 165.. Wife shalj. 
remain as beneficiary of said policy and husband shall keep 
all payments current. 
4. All dividends and proceeds received from husband's 
Government Life Insurance Policy no. V 109 72 23. Wife shall 
remain as beneficiary of said policy and husband shall ke^p 
all payments current. 
5. All dividends and proceeds received from husband^s 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Policy no. . Wife shall 
remain as beneficiary of said policy and husband shall keep 
all payments current. 
6. Husband's Blue Cross-Blue Shield Policy no. 99 54 58 
shall be transferred to wife and wife shall assume all pay-
ments required by said policy. 
7. All stock held in wife's name and one-half interest 
in all stock held in husband's name or in which he has any 
interest. Those stocks include but are not limited to: 
Western Oil Shale; Owanha Oil Corporation; Petroleum Invest-
ment Corporation, Solar Resources, Inc.; Cayman Corporation 
(both common stock and warrants). Royalty Investment; A f & 
Franciscan Oil; Friar Oil; Canyonlands Uranium; Silver Star-
Queens Mines, Inc.; Manhattan Resources; Samson Oil and Gas; 
Crescent General; and Sharp Mining Company. 
Within one year from the date of this agreement, husband 
shall furnish wife with a complete accounting of all stocks 
currently owned by him or in which he has any interest. 
If any stock held in husband's name or in which he has 
any interest has been pledged as collateral or security for 
any personal or corporate loan, husband shall remain liable 
for any indebtedness on said loan or loans. 
8. All royalty interests in oil, gas and other minerals 
currently in wife's name plus one-half of all royalty interests 
in all oil, gas and other minerals held in husband's name or 
in which husband has any interest. Those royalty interests 
include but are not limited to: Paradox Basin; Manhattan 
Unit; Rio Blanco County, Colorado; Last Chance, Emery County, 
Utah; and Mineral interests in Jackson County, Colorado. 
Within one year from the date of this ag-reement, husband 
shall furnish wife with a complete accounting of all royalty 
interests currently owned by him or in which he has any interest. 
If any royalty interest held in husband's name or in 
which he has any interest has been pledged as collateral or 
security for any personal or corporate loan, husband shall 
remain liable for any indebtedness on said loan or loans. 
9. Wife's one-half interest in the parties undivided 
one-half interest in the following described real property: 
a. Lts 17, 18, & 19 (Less Railroad R/W) Blk 59 
Park City, Utah 
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b. All of lot 14 & S 1/2 lot 15 Blk 58 Park City 
Survey 
c. Lots 17 to 32 incl Blk 58 Park City Survey 
10. All contractual interests in the parties1 reaj. 
property known as the Kitts Field House in Edgartown, 
Massachusetts. This includes but is not limited to the 
proceeds from the parties' second mortgage. 
11. The stock in ISI Industries is to be held in trust 
by Roe and Fowler pending the outcome of current litigation. 
At the conclusion of said litigation the stock awarded to 
husband or any net proceeds from its sale are to be divided 
equally between the parties, one-half to husband and on£-
half to wife. 
12. Right to sell the parties' real property located 
on North Water Street Edgartown, Massachusetts. Upon the 
sale of said property, all of the Wife's payments and expense* 
relating to said property are to be deducted from the sales 
price and the balance is to be divided equally between the 
parties, one-half to husband and one-half to wife. 
13. The furniture and personal effects located in the 
above described real property which have not already been, 
divided. 
14. One-half of husband's interest in Paradox Limited, 
a California Limited Partnership. 
15. One-half of each of husband's personal savings 
accounts including any savings accounts pledged as collateral 
for any personal or corporate loans. Husband shall remain 
liable for any indebtedness on said loan or loans. 
16. Right to sell the parties' real proparty located 
in Bartlett, New Hampshire, with the proceeds from such sale-rj-y; 
to be divided equally, one-half to husband and one-half to 
wife. 
17. One-half of husband's interest in real property 
located on East Main Street, Vernal, Utah. 
18. The entire interest in the parties' real property 
(lot) in Kitt's Field, Edgartown, Massachusetts. 
19. One-half interest in Malcolm C. Petrie's promissory 
note of April 19, 1975 to husband. Said one-half interest 
being equal to $3,125.00 plus interest if any. 
20. One-half of the parties' interest in real property 
known as the Anderson Ranch, Hyrum, Cache County, Utah. This 
entitles wife to one-half the parties' proceeds upon the sale 
of said property and gives the wife the option to sell her 
interest at its appraisal value, husband having the right of 
first refusal. 
21. Wife shall be given 20 days notice and shall have 
the right to be present when the three (3) safe deposit boxes 
in the names of Ellen C. Colman and William J. Colman, located 
in Quincy, Massachusetts are opened. Husband shall give Robert 
J. Colman the power of attorney to open the three (3) safe 
deposit boxes. 
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